2020--2021
Tuesday, March 16th, 3-4 PM
Eric Swanson (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
'If You See Something, Say Something’:
On the Dynamics of Deniable Possibility Raising
via ZOOM (email organizers for link)
Abstract:
N/A.
Friday, March 26th, 3-5 PM
Katharine Jenkins (University of Glasgow)
Gender and Ontic Injustice
via ZOOM (email organizers for link)
Abstract:
In previous work (Jenkins 2020) I have argued for the existence of a phenomenon I term ‘ontic injustice’, where a social kind is at least partially constituted by constraints and enablements that are wrongful to the individuals who are constructed as kind members. In such cases, I argue that being socially constructed as a kind member is wrongful in and of itself. The social kind ‘slave’ is a clear example of ontic injustice: we don’t need to know what happens to someone after they are socially constructed as a member of the social kind ‘slave’ to know that in being so constructed they have suffered a wrong. In this talk, I apply the concept of ontic injustice to gender. I argued that there are many varieties of gender kind, only some of which are ontically unjust. I then draw out some implications of this conclusion for discussions about gender recognition.
Friday, April 2nd, 3-5 PM
Alex Guerrero (Rutgers)
Identity Politics, Standpoint, and Minority Representation:
The Perils of Elections and the Promise of Lottocracy
via ZOOM (email organizers for link)
Abstract:
In this talk, I argue that electoral representative systems face two fundamental obstacles. One obstacle concerns political equality. I suggest that, in an important sense, it is impossible to distribute political power equally through electoral representative democracy under most modern political conditions. The second obstacle concerns epistemic quality. I argue that electoral representative systems will tend to do poorly at drawing on all the politically relevant knowledge held by the members of the political communities in which they exist. I argue that these two considerations, among others, should incline us toward taking seriously the use of random selection of political representatives. I present one such system for doing so--what I call the "lottocratic" system--and discuss how it might fare better in terms of both political equality and epistemic quality. Along the way, I also suggest a way of situating the idea of "identity politics" in a moral theory of politics. In the talk, I draw on and engage with the work of Lani Guinier, John Hart Ely, Patricia Hill Collins, Sandra Harding, Charles Mills, and Alison Wylie, among others.